John Yoo memo

repost from commentary on alternate site.

I'm reading it now and some things are coming to my now less-divided attention.

the President may deploy military force preemptively against terrorist organizations or the States that harbor or support them, whether or not they can be linked to the specific terrorist incidents of September 11.

preemptive use of force against nations or groups who have not threatened us is, as I understand illegal.

We cannot threaten a nation which has not attacked us, or threatened to. Our government officials are legally bound by the U.S. Constitution's adherence to international law that prohibits threats of use of force.

Pre-emptive strategies are pretty awful so far as I understand, because you are acting upon suspicion, there is no way to be "beyond a reasonable doubt."

I'm not sure whether the above points were stressed as a result of investigations into falsities in Yoo's argument, or whether they were merely not applied at the time that these memorandums were being created, and left unquestioned at large. I hope, that the public dissent from this idea, has longer reaches than the video, for example, and that similar documents and policies are eradicated asap.

Yoo discusses the following concept which is for me a sophomoric and unusual idea

some commentators have read the constitutional text differently. They argue that the vesting of the power to declare war gives Congress the sole authority to decide whether to make war. (6) This view misreads the constitutional text and misunderstands the nature of a declaration of war. Declaring war is not tantamount to making war

Further
he goes on to explain how the congress was not originally intended to be in charge of making merely that they can declare it.

If it were made publicly, even among these here peers, I would say that case does not hold water. Maybe I'm wrong on that, maybe he clearly justified his interpretation in such way.. se non é vero é ben trovato, if only in part.

He then goes on to cite history as evidence for interpretation of the value of declarations, namely that the numerous times in which we did not formally declare war on people with whom we engaged in armed or other conflict. I say no, you can't retrospectively determine the value of a policy like this, that way, just because we failed to be clear and bound legally, does not mean it should further undermine the sanctity of the original method. Or so I've held in my mind at least. That is, looking back on our tendency to engage without approval of the Congress, should not mean that the congress need not approve.

the constitutional structure requires that any ambiguities in the allocation of a power that is executive in nature - such as the power to conduct military hostilities - must be resolved in favor of the executive branch. Article II, section 1 provides that "[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States.

I thought that was pretty amazing. this could be because as of yet I do not know what constitutes executive power, and so because my Favorite document is once again really really vague, it is free game with rules for whoever most wants to win. The use of Alexander Hamilton is overtly clever, because as I understand Hamilton was huge on defense, against any parties by whom he felt threatened. There were at the time of these papers, which Yoo is using as binding documentation of the founding father's motives, people who were opposed to what Hamilton was saying, and this resulted in compromises, along with additions like the Tenth amendment and the bill of rights.

Thomas Jefferson was not supportive of Hamilton on a few things, and wrote to Madison expressing this, ”Nor will any degree of power in the hands of government prevent insurrections... After all, it is my principle that the will of the Majority should always prevail. If they approve the proposed Convention in all it's parts, I shall concur in it cheerfully, in hopes that they will amend it whenever they shall find it work wrong.”

Yoo There can be little doubt that the decision to deploy military force is "executive" in nature, and was traditionally so regarded.
Again, if only executive powers were better defined, so as to be without doubt. As the depletion of military forces is a very big deal, hence the cause for justification (sorry for being redundant) beyond a reasonable doubt.

Next, he uses Jefferson’s thoughts on foreign policy and the senate to justify his point..

The following really caught me off guard. Until I read who was responsible, and when it was dated.
Attorney General William P. Barr, quoting the opinion of Attorney General Jackson just cited, advised the President in 1992 that "[y]ou have authority to commit troops overseas without specific prior Congressional approval 'on missions of good will or rescue, or for the purpose of protecting American lives or property or American interests.'" Authority to Use United States Military Forces in Somalia, 16 Op. O.L.C. at 6 (citation omitted).

Barr served under HW Bush, and is a big player in a lot of the same activities as the yes-men mentioned in the Cheney video.
Intervening in the House bank scandal, Attorney General William P. Barr today appointed a retired Federal appeals court judge as a special counsel to review the check-writing practices of lawmakers and the operations of the bank.
A bit of quid pro quo from Barr, could be seen in what I noticed looking up his general demeanor;
From 1977 to 1978, Barr clerked for Judge Malcolm Wilkey of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. From 1978 to 1982, he was in private law practice with Shaw, Pittman, Potts, & Trowbridge. He then served on the White House Domestic Policy Staff under President Reagan (1982-1983), returning to practice from 1984 to 1989. p://www.millercenter.virginia.edu/academic/americanpresident/bush/essays/cabinet/692
later
Mr. Barr named Malcolm R. Wilkey, a Republican, who sat on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia from 1970 to 1985, to head the preliminary inquiry intended to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to warrant a criminal investigation of the bank's activities. http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/d/democratic_party/index.html?query=BARR,%20WILLIAM%20P&field=per&match=exact

Not that that is unheard of, but looking into the context a little, that seems oddly congruent.
Moving back to Yoo. I hope somebody can clarify this for me, as our actions in Haiti
Recent and distant, deserve a bit of consideration, as pertains to moral/legal standing and justifications.

In Deployment of United States Armed Forces into Haiti, 18 Op. O.L.C. 173 (1994), we advised that the President had the authority unilaterally to deploy some 20,000 troops into Haiti. We relied in part on the structure of the WPR, which we argued "makes sense only if the President may introduce troops into hostilities or potential hostilities without prior authorization by the Congress." Id. at 175-76. We further argued that "in establishing and funding a military force that is capable of being projected anywhere around the globe, Congress has given the President, as Commander in Chief, considerable discretion in deciding how that force is to be deployed." Id. at 177. We also cited and relied upon the past practice of the executive branch in undertaking unilateral military interventions.

Yoo goes systematically and supports his argument that because of prior actions without consent of congress what we do now is free game, idea with some historical based perspectives, though from what little understanding I have of history, every one of those could just as easily justify limitation of executive power in interests of peace, and human rights. (see commentary by Chalmers Johnson in Blowback for alternative historical perspective)
This tendency is outlined by Yoo

The historical record demonstrates that the power to initiate military hostilities, particularly in response to the threat of an armed attack, rests exclusively with the President. As the Supreme Court has observed, "[t]he United States frequently employs Armed Forces outside this country - over 200 times in our history - for the protection of American citizens or national security… On at least 125 such occasions, the President acted without prior express authorization from Congress."

Referring to Clinton, he makes a connection to past presidential response to threats of terrorist attacks, specifically against Bin Laden. Furthermore, in explaining why military action was necessary, the President noted that "law enforcement and diplomatic tools" to combat terrorism had proved insufficient, and that "when our very national security is challenged . . . we must take extraordinary steps to protect the safety of our citizens."

I do not hold President Clinton’s foreign (or domestic) policies in high regard, and see this as another way in which Yoo poorly justifies his point.. citing one violent president to justify another.

I may build on this, add a conclusion or something later. Draw your own really.